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CALIFORNIA'S SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH-
CRIMINAL OR PATIENT?
I
CALIFORNIA'S SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH LAW
The sexual psychopath law resulted from insistent demands on the part of
medical and legal leaders, as well as some enlightened civic groups, who
were convinced that the commission of a sex crime is usually, if not always,
evidence of a mental disorder which should be treated rather than pun-
ished.' Although not always viewed with complete approval by the courts,'
the enactment by the legislature of the sexual psychopath law was gen-
erally hailed as a realistic and significant step toward progress in the law.'
As defined by statute, a "mentally disordered sex offender" means any
person who by reason of mental defect, disease or disorder is predisposed
to the commission of sexual offenses to such a degree that he is dangerous
to the health and safety of others.4
When a person is convicted of any criminal offense, the trial judge
may, if it appears that there is probable cause for believing that such per-
son is a mentally disordered sex offender,' adjourn the proceeding or sus-
pend the sentence and certify the person for a hearing and examination by
the Superior Court to determine whether he is a mentally disordered sex
offender.6 This procedure is not applicable to any person sentenced to death
or ineligible for probation.7 The person certified or alleged to be a men-
tally disordered sex offender is then taken before a judge of the Superior
Court and informed of the allegation made and of his right to make a reply
and produce witnesses. The judge then fixes a time and place for the hear-
ing, and arranges for the probation officer's report to be made available
143 CALIF. L. REV. 766 (1955).
2 For a vigorous dissent which exemplified the classical view of punishment rather than
treatment, and a reluctance to place any faith in the ability of psychiatrists to be of any bene-
fit to the mentally disordered sex offender, see Doran, J., in People v. Hector, 104 Cal.App.2d
392, 231 P.2d 916 (1951).
3 "It is a significant step when the law, through legislative enactment, gives recognition to a
person who, though not insane, is not wholly responsible for his criminal manifestations." 14
BAYLOR L. REV. 93, 104 (1962) ; Cf. 1 STAN. L. REV. 486 (1949).
4 WEST's ANN. WELFARE & INST. CODE §5500.
5, "Sexual psychopath" is construed to have the same meaning as "mentally disordered sex
offender." WEST's ANN. WELFARE & INST. CODE §5500.
6 1d.§5501 (a). Note: Whereas the procedure as set out by §5501 (a) is discretionary in
the event the person has been convicted of any criminal offense, §§5501 (b) and (c) make such
procedure mandatory where the person is convicted of a sex offense involving a child under
14 years of age and the offense is a misdemeanor and the person has previously been con-
victed of a sex offense in this or any other state, or the sex offense involving a child under 14
years of age is a felony.
7 Id. §5500.5.
8 Id. §5503.
to the court.' Two or three qualified psychiatrists are appointed to examine
the alleged offender in order to determine whether he is in fact a mentally
disordered sex offender.' ° If the person is found not to be such he is
returned for sentencing. If he is found to be a mentally disordered sex
offender who would not benefit by care and treatment in a state hospital,
the court may return him to the original court for sentencing."
If, on the other hand, it appears that there is sufficient cause to believe
that the person is a mentally disordered sex offender, the judge may re-
quire that such person be placed in a psychiatric facility or state hospital
for observation and diagnosis for a period not to exceed 90 days.
The superintendent of the hospital is then required to report to the
court the diagnosis and recommendations concerning such person within
90 days. This diagnosis and recommendation report is to include an opin-
ion as to whether or not the person is a mentally disordered sex offender;
whether or not he is a danger to the health and safety of others; whether
or not he will benefit by care and treatment in a state hospital, and a
recommendation as to the person's future care, supervision, and treatment.
If the report states that the person is not a mentally disordered sex of-
fender or that he is a mentally disordered sex offender but will not bene-
fit by care or treatment in a state hospital and is a danger to the health
and safety of others, he is returned to the court to await further action
with reference to the criminal charges (usually sentencing).
In the latter circumstance, the court also has the option of returning
the person to the superior court which may, upon a similar finding, commit
him for an indefinite period to the Department of Mental Hygiene for
placement in a state institution or institutional unit for the care and treat-
ment of mentally disordered sex offenders where he is to remain until he
is no longer a danger to the health and safety of others.
If, however, the superintendent of the hospital reports that the person
is a mentally disordered sex offender and could benefit by treatment in a
state hospital, the court would still have the option either to return his
case to the criminal court for further disposition or to commit him to the
state hospital for an indeterminate period. 2 When a person is committed
for an indeterminate period the superintendent of the state hospital is
required to file an opinion with the court if he believes that the person (a)
will not benefit by further treatment in the hospital and is not a danger to
the health and safety of others, or (b) has not recovered and is still a
danger to the health and safety of others. If the opinion reflects (a) above,
the person is returned to the court, either to be sentenced or placed on pro-
9 ld. §5503.5.
'Old. §5504.
11 Id. §5511,7.
12 Id. §5512.
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bation for at least five years, provided that the person is eligible for pro-
bation." But if the opinion reflects (b), the person is returned to the com-
mitting court where it may impose sentence or probation. An alternative is
to recertify the person to the Superior Court, which may recommit him
for an indeterminate period to a state institution for the care and treat-
ment of such mentally disordered sex offenders. 4
Subsequent reports of the superintendent may be required after con-
finement of the person for at least six months, with procedures followed
as outlined above. 5
The courts have determined that this law is civil' 6 and collateral to
criminal proceedings17 for the purpose of protecting society from the ac-
tivities of sexual psychopaths. 18 It secondarily affords a means whereby
persons found guilty of criminal offenses may be aided by medical treat-
ment.'9 As construed by the courts, the law was not intended to be a miti-
gating circumstance,20 nor does it give rise to an inference of permanent
insanity on the part of the offender. 2 The law cannot be used as a legal
bypass whereby those suffering dangerous sexual perversions might be
kept in a mental hospital for a short time and then released,22 since any
medical treatment is in addition to, and not in lieu of, punishment.'
Thus, upon superficial examination the psychopath law would seem to
satisfy the demands of those groups demanding society's protection from
heinous sex crimes and of those groups calling for treatment rather than
punishment of such offenders. 24 But it must here be noted that ". . . the
road leads to either or both the insane asylum or the penitentiary . 25
and that in the end ". . . the existence of (the mental) disorder is not a
defense to a charge of the crime, and the offender is held completely ac-
countable therefore." 26
13 1d. §5517.
14 Id. §5518.
15 Id. §5519.
16 People v. Fuller, 226 Cal.App.2d 331, 38 CaI.Rptr. 25 (1964) ; People v. Barzee, 213 Cal.
App.2d 139, 28 Cal.Rptr. 692 (1963); People v. Redford, 194 Cal.App.2d 200, 14 Cal.Rptr.
866 (1961).
17 People v. Hymes, 161 Cal.App.2d 668, 327 P.2d 219 (1958); People v. Olds, 140 Cal.
App.2d 156, 294 P.2d 1034 (1956).
18 People v. McCracken, 39 Cal.2d 336, 246 P.2d 913 (1952) ; People v. Levy, 151 Cal.App.
2d 460, 311 P.2d 897 (1957) ; cf. 25 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 203, 232 (1950).
19 Thurmond v. Superior Court, 49 Cal.2d 17, 314 P.2d 6 (1953) ; People v. Levy, supra.
20 People v. McCracken, supra note 18; People v. Levy, supra note 18.
21 People v. Jensen, 43 Cal.2d 572, 275 P.2d 25 (dictum) (1954).
22 Ex parte Gross, 115 Cal.App.2d 502, 252 P.2d 416 (1949).
2 3 People v. Levy, 151 Cal. App.2d 460, 311 P.2d 897 (1957).
2443 CALIF. L. REV. 766 (1955).
25 96 U. OF PA. L. REV. 872 (1948).
26 Op. cit. supra; cf. 43 CALF. L. REv. 766, 776 (1955).
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II
PERSONS DEFINED AS PSYCOPATHS
The use of the term "psychopath" as used in the sexual psychopath stat-
ute has been said to be an objectionable one since it attempts to lump
together on the one hand offenses such as violent rape of children, and on
the other, exhibitionism, and the voyeurism of the "peeping Tom" pre-
sumably referring to one definite disease pattern. To apply essentially
uniform rules and identical methods of hospitalization to people who only
challenge concepts of modesty and to people who seriously endanger the
physical integrity of other human beings seems to be a serious legislative
mistake.
The label of "psychopath," then, includes individuals not far removed
from ordinary criminals, who should be treated accordingly and, at the
other end of the spectrum, some so clearly akin to psychotics that they
should be exonerated of guilt for their crimes. 28
Psychiatrists are uncertain as to what causes the psychopath to act as
he does, and are not in unanimity as to the proper treatment to be ren-
dered,29 but it is generally agreed that psychopathic personality disorders
are manifested primarily by aberrant social conduct and by non-conform-
ity to generally accepted standards of behavior. ° There is also general
agreement that a sexual psychopath is the most difficut to treat of all ab-
normal personalities, 3 ' since he is extremely unresponsive to any sort of
penal or corrective measures, and this expedient often produces a very
rebellious attitude on his part.2
The psychopath is further characterized by recedivism to such an
extent that the paroled sex offender is seen to commit the same crime over
and over again.33
2743 CALIF. L. REV. 766, 770, 771 (1955).
28 53 J. CRrm. L., C. & P. S. 446 (1962); see Odenwald, Punishment from the Viewpoint of
Psychiatry, 6 CATHOLIC LAW 126, 133 (1960).
2953 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 446 (1962); see 56 J. CRn. L., C. & P. S. 27 (1965) for a
scholarly discussion of the methods of analysis employed by psychiatrists in their examinations
of sexual psychopaths, and the difficulties of determination of pathognomonic signs of sexual
deviation.
30 53 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 446 (1962); see WEIHOFFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL
DEFENSE 22 (1954).
31 14 BAYLOR L. REV. 93, 107 (1962) ; see WHITE, ABNORMAL PERSONALITIES.
32 11 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 636, 640 (1949); see NoYEs, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 411
(3rd Edition, 1948).
33 11 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 636, 641 (1949). For California cases involving application of the
sexual psychopathy law to persons who had prior convictions for the same or similar offenses,
see: People v. Schaletzke, 49 Cal.Rptr. 275 (1966) ; People v. McCracken, 39 Cal.2d 336, 246
P.2d 913 (1952) ; In re Keddy, 105 Cal.App.2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951) ; Gross v. Superior
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III
HOSPITALIZATION OR IMPRISONMENT?
The recent case of People v. Schaletzke 4 is exemplary of the practical
application of the current sexual psychopath law.
Defendant Schaletzke was arrested in 1956 for annoying or molesting
a child under 18 years of age"5 and was given two years probation. In 1957
Schaletzke was again arrested on the same charge and was sent to Atasca-
dero State Hospital where he remained for three months. After leaving the
hospital he was sentenced to a year's term in the county jail and four years
probation.
In the latter case Schaletzke had been arrested for lewd and lascivious
conduct with a child under the age of fourteen years. 6 Schaletzke was
convicted but proceedings were suspended because the court found him to
be a probable mentally disordered sex offender. He was sent once again to
Atascadero for observation and diagnosis for a period not to exceed 90
days.
The court received a report from the superintendent of Atascadero
which certified that the patient was a mentally disordered sex offender;
that society still needed to be protected from him; and that he was not
amenable to treatment in a hospital setting and should be returned to the
criminal court for action. Upon consideration of this report, the court
denied probation and sentenced the defendant to a prison term.
In the course of its opinion in that case the court said, "The sexual
psychopath law was passed because experience has shown that sexual psy-
chopaths are unable to benefit from ordinary penal confinement and are
in need of medical treatment . . . ."" [Emphasis added.] Yet the defend-
ant was imprisoned for the commission of an act which admittedly arose
from a mental disorder. This points to an obvious deficiency in the legal
apparatus designed to cope with this type of problem.
The rebellious attitude of the sexual psychopath toward penal confine-
ment, his tendency to commit the same offense and the difficulty involved
Court, 42 Cal.2d 816, 270 P.2d 1025 (1954) ; People v. Levy, 151 Cal.App.2d 460, 311 P.2d 897
(1957); People v. Redford, 194 Cal.App.2d 200, 14 Cal.Rptr. 866 (1961) ; People v. Wells, 112
Cal.App.2d 672, 246 P.2d 1023 (1952) ; People v. Hector, 104 Cal.App.2d 392, 231 P.2d 916
(1951) ; People v. Neal, 108 Cal.App.2d 491, 239 P.2d 38 (1951) ; People v. Hite, 134 Cal.App.
2d 536, 286 P.2d 425 (1955) ; People v. Warren, 219 Cal.App.2d 723, 33 Cal.Rptr. 552 (1963) ;
People v. Morgan, 146 Cal.App.2d 722, 304 P.2d 138 (1956); People v. Blume, 183 Cal.App.2d
474, 7 Cal.Rptr. 16 (1960) ; People v. Elliott, 158 Cal.App.2d 623, 322 P.2d 1029 (1958).
34 49 Cal.Rptr. 275 (1966).
35 WEST'S ANN. PENAL CODE §647a.
36 Id. §288.
3749 Cal.Rptr. 275, 277, 278 (1966).
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in his treatment, lead to the conclusion that the penal institution is unsatis-
factory both for rehabilitation of the "patient" and for protecting society
from the danger of his acts.
What then of the state hospitals, the remedy introduced by the legisla-
ture and acclaimed as a giant step toward progress? 88 The psychopath's
introduction to this medium is during his 90 day "observation period." 39
Due to the lack of sufficient and adequately trained personnel, this period
is actually not being used for continuous and thorough study; also, the
examination by the two or three psychiatrists is of little value because the
examination (which may determine the disposition of the case for many
years or even a lifetime) are usually limited to one or at the most two
interviews of an hour to an hour and a half."
As of 1958, only fifteen states had more than 50% of the total number
of physicians needed to staff the public mental hospitals, according to the
standards set by the American Psychiatric Association. It has been said
that in many of our hospitals about the best that can be done is to give a
physical examination and make a mental note on each patient once a year.
Often the staff is insufficient to accomplish even this.4 1
It would seem then that offering extensive psychiatric treatment to
large numbers of convicted psychopaths by committing them to public
mental hospitals rather than imprisoning them in penal institutions is in
vain, since any increase in the number of difficult-to-manage criminal
psychopaths in public mental institutions can only mean that many of the
patients now in these overcrowded and understaffed hospitals will receive
even less care than they are now getting. The criminal psychopaths com-
mitted to these institutions would, under present conditions, receive no
therapy, but only custody in a public mental institution that would be for
them, in everything but name, a penal institution.42 The state brings this
situation about by compelling the institutionalization of mentally ill per-
sons and then failing to appropriate sufficient funds to enable the institu-
tion to procure the proper personnel and facilities to provide therapeutic,
rather than mere custodial care.43
Thus, the psychopath has heretofore been relegated to either a prison
or a state hospital, or both, neither of which is a proper place for him."
38 43 CALIF. L. REV. 766 (1955).
3 9 WEST'S ANN. WELFARE & INST. CODE §5512.
4043 CALIF. L. REv, 766 (1955).
41 Solomon, The American Psychiatric Association in Relation to American Psychiatry, 115
Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 7 (1958); cf. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499, 500
(1960).
42 Birnbaum, How to Treat the Criminal Psychopath, 52 A.B.A.J. 69, 72, 73 (1966).
43 Birnbaum, Thg Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
44 96 U. oF PA. L. REv. 872 (1948); see also SINGER & KROHN , INSANITY AND THE LAW
151 (1924); GLUCK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 383 (1925).
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Placed in the insane asylum, the psychopath is seen to cause incessant
trouble, detracting from the possibility of effective care and treatment of
the truly insane for whom the institution was established. In the penal
institution these individuals are not understood and disorder becomes in-
evitable due to the psychopath's predisposition to becoming insubordinate,
which leads to the adoption of repressive measures which necessarily en-
hance the admittedly difficult undertaking of curing these persons.4
IV
PROPOSALS
How, then, can this problem be remedied? It is submitted that the first
modification to be made in the present law is one which follows the prece-
dent set by Indiana and Michigan, allowing commitment as a sexual psy-
chopath to constitute a complete defense to any further criminal pro-
ceedings growing out of the act involved. 46 The defense should only be
allowed if the person was found to be a sexual psychopath within the mean-
ing of the existing law and such determination had become final. The most
effective argument to be made for this proposal is that no longer would the
prospect of incarceration after treatment confront the psychopath. Knowl-
edge that under the present law, "when treatment terminates prison be-
gins" retards the initiative on the part of the patient, thus destroying one
of the most essential aspects of psychiatric treatment-the cooperation of
the patient.47 With a final adjudication of sexual psychopathy under the
proposed change, the state would be required to commit the psychopath
for an indeterminate period of time (i.e. until sufficient recovery is
achieved) .48
Secondly, separate facilities which are staffed by psychiatrists, psychol-
ogists, and sociologists should be established. As proposed above, those
persons found guilty of sex crimes under sections 5501 (b) and (c) of the
California Welfare and Institutions Code would be committed to this insti-
tution for an indeterminate period of time.
In the proposed institution, facilities should be available for compre-
hensive psychiatric treatment. Staff social workers and psychologists
would prepare case histories, interviews for counseling purposes, etc. 9 The
environment of the institution should as much as possible resemble free
society in order that the psychopath does not rebel being incarcerated in
45 SINGER & KROHN, op. cit. supra, note 121, page 152.
4 6 See IND. ANN. STAT., §9-3409 (Supp. 1959) ; MICH. STAT. ANN., §28.967 (8) (1954).
47 11 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 636, 651 (1949) ; cf. 14 BAYLOR L. REV. 93, 104 (1962). Note, this
proposal would only apply to persons committed under WELFARE & INST. CODE §5501 (b) and
(c). See footnote 3, supra.
48 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S. 215, 225 (1960).
4 9 53 J. CRn . L., C. & P. S. 446, 450 (1962).
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what seems to him to be a prison, and to enable the psychiatrists in charge
to treat their patients in a more natural setting. This is not to suggest that
the psychopath should be subjected to a minimum security institution;
there is a reasonable point between complete freedom and the stark con-
finement found in a cell.
Such an institution has been established in Maryland,5" and has with-
stood the argument that with commitment being for an indeterminate
period, the detention may be in excess of the original sentence imposed by
the court."
Thirdly, there should be adequate state financing of this project, which
is the sine qua non of the project's success. The proposed institution will
be no better than the staff and plant facilities available to guarantee its
efficacy. Indeterminate commitment to an institution not properly equipped
would be little improvement over the present situation. Since commitment
of dangerous sexual psychopaths comes within the state's power of parens
patriae, the above proposals merely complete a task already undertaken
by the state.
While courts have become more realistic in their attempt to rehabilitate
the convicted mentally disordered sex offender, their attempt is necessarily
restricted by their duty to protect society from these persons who may,
under the present law, be prematurely released. Such a restriction would
be obviated by the proposed amendment requiring indeterminate commit-
ment of such offenders to an institution properly geared to cope with their
particular problems. This would seem to present a far better picture both
as regards the possibilities of rehabilitation and cure for the psychopath
and the protection of society, not to mention the release of the burden
presently borne by the state hospitals which are required to attempt to
care for these offenders while already overcrowded with persons severely
mentally ill.
This group of proposals may not be a panacea, but it presents a pic-
ture closer to the realization of goals which have long been pursued and are
only slowly being achieved. William R. Foley
5 0 Id. at 452.
51 The state has the power to restrain the liberty of persons dangerous to the health and
safety of the people. Simmons v. Director, Patuxtent Institution, 227 Md. 661, 177 A.2d 409
(1962) ; cf. Roberts v. Director, Patuxtent Institution, 222 Md. 643, 172 A.2d 880 (1961).
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